The Conservative Version of Marriage

The issue of whether to extend marriage to homosexual relationships seems to be a defining characteristic of our time, and I suppose I should put forth my two cents, seeing as the Supreme Court will take up a few cases addressing the issue.  I think that an argument for the conservative position regarding marriage should be expressed as clearly as possible, if for no other reason than because of the ease with which the opposing side can set up a divisive straw-man/ad hominem attack . . . after all, do "we" need any more evidence of the bigotry and hatefulness of "those" crazy  right-wingers?  They're just a bunch of old, angry white men anyway.  Right?

In this post I will limit my inquiry into whether there is any inalienable right connected to marriage, and if there is, whether that right extends to homosexual relationships.  This is a distinct inquiry from one centering on equality.  This distinction I suppose will be disappointing to some, since the two inquiries are often jumbled together in everyday discussions regarding this issue.  However, equality and inalienable rights are distinct matters and clear thinking on any particular issue should treat them accordingly.  I will further limit my inquiry to the philosophical underpinnings of the arguments of both sides rather than delving into legal arguments.  This is because, in my opinion, there are perfectly good legal arguments to be made on either side.  For example, the Supreme Court has indicated on several occasions that the decision of who to marry is a personal choice that should not be restricted by the state.  However, such a "right to marriage" is muddied by case law indicating that it can be regulated, as can be seen in this excerpt from a still valid Supreme Court case: "Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is nevertheless, in most civilized nations, a civil contract, and usually regulated by law.  Upon it society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social relations and social obligations and duties, with which government is necessarily required to deal."  Honestly, as far as purely legalistic arguments go, there are perfectly good arguments to be made on both sides and my two cents in that arena are, at present, worthless.  So, what I am concerned with here, are the more philosophical underpinnings for the arguments because it is there that my thoughts may have an impact on the minds of those who read this post.

The Two Versions of Marriage
The two sides approach this debate with very different understandings of what function marriage serves in society. The LGBT community, as far as I can tell, is advocating an approach in which marriage functions as a recognition of and support for loving, committed, sexual relationships. The conservatives are advocating for an approach in which marriage functions, similarly, as a source of support and recognition, but for those who are engaged in, or who anticipate being engaged in, a sexual relationship and are committed to each other in such a manner that they will together assume the primary responsibility of raising any children conceived as a result of their sexual activities.  The divide is not very difficult to appreciate. For the conservative, homosexual activity alone, no matter how loving and committed the participants are to each other, cannot result in bearing children, and so marriage is inapplicable.  For the LGBT community, love, commitment, and sexual activity are clearly not contingent on a particular sexual preference, namely a heterosexual relationship.

Inalienable Rights Associated with Relationships
Both of these versions of marriage address relationships, suggesting that some relationships are such that the participants are entitled to societal support and recognition.  I have to believe that even the LGBT community will accept that, if there is such an entitlement for some relationships, not all relationships are similarly entitled (at least on their own terms - remember an equality analysis is distinct from an inalienable rights analysis).  For example, I have a friend.  We enjoy each others' company.  We watch sports, we play sports, we discuss politics, we eat food.  There is no reason why our friendship warrants the same kind of recognition and support from society as my relationship with my wife.  Or as another example, my wife and I own a dog.  We love our dog.  I like to think she loves us.  But clearly our relationship with our dog is not entitled to the same recognition and support from society as my relationship with my wife.  Finally, many people have participated in one-night stands, engaging in sexual activity that, while I'm sure its exciting and fun, does not really seem to deserve recognition and support from society.  So, on their own terms, not all relationships are entitled to the same support and recognition.

Some might think that there is no inalienable right to societal support and recognition for any relationship, and I can understand that initial reaction.  It seems odd to think that the relationships that I form might create some sort of entitlement from society.  But it does seem to me that there are some inalienable rights (if not a right to support and recognition) associated with relationships.  In fact, my concept of inalienable rights hinges on relationships.  To me, an inalienable right is an individual's expectation regarding the behavior of others and of society which arises necessarily from the relationship between that individual and society.  Because an individual does not live in isolation, the role of the individual in this formulation can easily be expanded to include the particular relationships that individual is in.  Thus, there may be an inalienable right regarding one's relationship with another if that right arises necessarily from the connection between that relationship and the rest of society.  For example, the Supreme Court has expressed an inalienable right regarding sexual relationships involving consenting adults acting in the privacy of one's home.  The Court has recognized that individual's have a reasonable expectation to be free from government regulation, interference or intrusion regarding such a sexual relationship.  Clearly there is an interplay with the idea of privacy, and without getting too far off topic, I'm willing to go with the Court on this one.  So, for purposes of this post, we can stipulate that sexual relationships between consenting adults, in which their sexual activity is conducted in private, are such that the connection between those relationships and the rest of society necessarily creates an expectation to be free from governmental regulation, interference, or intrusion. 

Inalienable Rights of Children
There is a fact, which I should hope is well known, that some kinds of sexual activity present the "risk" of creating children.  This has a very serious significance for society.  In fact, society cannot continue to exist without the creation of new members to at least replace those who die.  The necessary expectation would seem to be that society may act to preserve itself, and hence to take some sort of action regarding the creation, or potential creation, of new members, i.e. children.  Society exists, in part, to provide a greater chance of successful procreation and insofar as the right to sexual activity is recognized, that basic relationship between society and individuals seems to be satisfied.  However, once a child is created, it cannot provide for its own needs and is not prepared to confront the challenges of life or to be a contributing member of society.  The child relies on society to provide, in particular, the protection required to allow it to mature physically, mentally, and emotionally.  Theoretically, there are many ways in which society could provide this protection and guide a child through the maturation process.  However, biology has presented the most straightforward manner - the biological mother and father are generally imbued with an enormous amount of love and concern for the new child that they are willing to take on many hardships to provide the protection and guidance themselves.  In fact, this parent-child relationship is another relationship regarding which the Supreme Court has recognized an inalienable right, which I am equally willing to follow.  The right is essentially that the biological parents of a child have the necessary expectation to be free from societal regulation, infringement, or intrusion regarding their relationship with that child, insofar as they are not damaging the maturation (physical, mental, or emotional) of the child.  It should be especially noted that this inalienable right of the parents is actually dependent on the inalienable right of the child to be protected and guided throughout its maturation process until it is able, or should reasonably be able, to confront the challenges of life and to be a contributing member of society.  Hence, there is an inalienable right which is in fact an entitlement upon society - the right of the child to be protected and guided until it has matured. 

The Inalienable Right of Marriage
It is upon this entitlement, and its connection to the biological parents of a child, that the conservative version of marriage is predicated.  Because society has essentially outsourced its responsibility to care for and guide its new members to the biological parent-child relationship, it is reasonable that those who have assumed the responsibility are "compensated."  Furthermore, it is reasonable that society "encourage" the parents in their commitment, both to cooperate with each other and to actually care for the child, which can understandably wax and wane over time.  Therefore, it can be argued that the biological parents of a child also have an inalienable right to some form of societal support and recognition.  Historically, this support and recognition has taken the form of marriage, which has enjoyed varying levels of actual support over the centuries, but has for millennia been a form of recognition of those who either have created a child through their sexual activities, or who reasonably anticipate creating a child through their sexual activities.  These relationships which warrant societal support involve partners who are sexually active and are committed to their relationship to each other.  This commitment has generally been recognized to be most successful when there is a level of love between the participants.  Hence, the elements of the LGBT version of marriage are present: sexually active, and lovingly committed couples.  However, the reason of the societal support is not because of these elements, but because these elements have the potential of creating new life, of bringing new members into the society, and that these elements are the best known to prepare these new members for success in society.  In other words, while the elements of the LGBT version of marriage are necessary for the success of this relationship deserving of societal support, they are not sufficient to establish that relationship.

Homosexual Potential for Creating Life
However, it can be argued that homosexual relationships have the potential of creating new human life as well.  For example, a male couple could use the semen from one of them to fertilize an egg which has been harvested from a woman, known or unknown, and have that egg implanted into another woman.  Nine months pass, and ... voila! A child is born.  Here, the "biological" parents are significantly less clear than in a conventional birth. The "mother" could be either the surrogate who carried the child to term or the woman who donated her egg, or both. The father's identity, however, is clear - the man who donated the semen. This however leaves out the father's male partner.  Assuming that they are in a lovingly committed relationship, it is highly likely that the father's partner played a significant role in the decision to create a new human life.  Would it not be in the best interest of the child to be raised by the gay couple which are responsible for the decision to bring the child into the world, and in the best interest of the gay couple who feel connected to the child in a deep emotional way?

However, this scenario must address the issue of whether there is an inalienable right to pursue such modern forms of conception.  An inalienable right cannot be predicated on an alienable right.  In other words, if there is no inalienable right to to modern forms of conception (or phrased differently, if the state can legitimately outlaw such modern forms of conception), then an inalienable right to marriage cannot be predicated upon those modern forms of conception. 

Perhaps one might try to argue that such an "anchor" right is a right to contract.  However, such an argument is pretty clearly sailing against some strong headwinds.  Do parents have a right to enter into a contract selling their child's labor?  Does an individual have the right to enter into a contract to kill some 3rd party, or even to kill the other party to the transaction?  Can't the state regulate employment contracts, especially regarding minimum wage or safe working conditions?  The general consensus would be that there is no inalienable right to contract in any manner or for any purpose, although philosophically I suppose that is debatable.  Just going with that consensus though, the power of the state to regulate contractual relationships would at least initially include the right to contract with other parties to pursue modern forms of conception.  So it seems that a general right to contract can't be the anchor for such a right.

It might be argued that there is an inalienable right to be a parent, and that the right to contract for modern forms of conception is therefore predicated on that right, and the right to marry therefore extends to homosexual relationships.  While being a parent is a satisfying, though obviously difficult, experience and while I would personally consider it a necessary part of a full and satisfying life, I find it difficult to find that one has an inalienable right to become a parent.  We previously found that those who do become parents have an inalienable right associated with their child, but that doesn't mean that any given individual has the right to become a parent.  For example, no normal human being can become a parent individually.  One may become a parent individually through adoption, but that I should think is pretty clearly a matter of societal discretion - the biological parents have abdicated their rights, therefore it is society's responsibility to care for the child, and society may find that a particular individual is better capable to care for that child.  May find.  It is society's responsibility to make sure that the best interests of the child are the deciding factor, regardless of any interest that individual may have.  So any  supposed right to be a parent must come down to a right to engage in any relationship which can create human life, including those contractual relationships necessary for modern forms of conception. One can point to one of the purposes of society already mentioned, i.e. to provide a greater chance of procreation.  The fact that science has developed these modern forms of conception is simply another way in which society fulfills this basic function.  Originally, only the right of consenting adults to privately engage in sexual activity fulfilled this function.  Now, modern forms of conception can supplement that right.

A Further Refinement of the Concept of Marriage
Prior to this point, I have addressed marriage in connection with biological parents and with those who reasonably anticipate that their sexual activity might result in the creation of children.  The significance of being a biological parent is that the biological parent-child relationship gives rise to a necessary expectation that one would be the primary provider of the protection and guidance required by the child.  Because there are generally two surviving biological parents with equal expectations to be the primary provider, it is in society's interest, the parents' interest, and the child's interest, to unite the expectations of the two biological parents into a single "entity."  Hence, marriage is meant to unite those individuals who have equally legitimate expectations to be the primary caretaker of a new child, encouraging cooperation etc.  Where those expectations are not equal, then the primary caretaker is clear, and a unity of expectations is not necessary and marriage does not apply (although that primary caretaker may be entitled to some form of support and recognition from society which is distinct from marriage).  The significance of reasonably anticipating that conception may result from the sexual activity of the marriage partners is that such a reasonable anticipation creates a presumption that a child actually conceived by a married woman would be the result of the sexual activity of the married couple, thereby establishing a presumption that both the husband and the wife are the biological parents.  Of course, this presumption can be rebutted, but it is a convenient preliminary method to quickly establish who has what expectations.

Back to Modern Forms of Conception
Accepting an inalienable right to modern forms of conception for the sake of argument, our inquiry then turns to whether this "right" translates into a similar right to marriage for homosexual couples.  I do not think it does.  In other words, I think such a situation is sufficiently distinct from the conditions which give rise to the right to marriage so as to make that right inapplicable.  As one will recall, the right to marriage arose from 1) the right of the child to be protected and guided through its maturation process, and 2) from the right of the biological parents to be the primary source of protection and guidance for the child insofar as they do not actually impede its maturation process.  Clearly, the right of a child conceived through modern forms of conception does not change.  It is still entitled to protection and guidance.  However, the right to be the primary source of that protection and guidance does not seem to be the same when modern forms of conception are employed by a homosexual couple.  As indicated above, the relationships of the parties involved are complex.  It may be that the birth mother has a legitimate interest in the well-being of the child as well.  She, after all, would be the one most potently affected by the biological facts of life.  In our scenario, only one of the male partners was responsible for creating the child, i.e. is the biological parent.  The other may have been a significant factor in the decision to create the child, but was not a physical causal force.  Because only the biological parents have a necessary expectation of being the primary provider of the child's protection and guidance, there is no need for a uniting of interests between the male partners.

It seems to me that the strongest argument in favor of an inalienable right to societal support and recognition for homosexual couples would be that the lovingly committed nature of their relationship warrants an extension of the generalization that biological parents are the best positioned to provide the necessary child care.  However, that assumes that the biological parents' rights are because they are actually better positioned to care for a child.  That is not the case.  The biological parents' rights arise because the biological facts of life are so powerful that to ignore them would violate the parents' reasonable, and necessary, expectation that they would be the primary providers.  The same kind of necessary expectation as that of a biological mother and father does not arise in the case of a homosexual couple.  I would be willing to grant that the loving, committed, and sexually active nature of the relationship should be considered if there is ever a problem regarding custody.  They are two adults in a presumably mature and reasonably healthy relationship.  It certainly is relevant in showing a capacity to provide for the needs of a child during its maturation process.  However, the issue of who is best positioned to provide for the needs of the child is only relevant in the exercise of society's discretion to "outsource" its responsibility of providing the protection and guidance for a child.  One does not have an inalienable right to be the provider of a particular child's needs merely by the fact that one is better positioned to provide those needs than society itself is.

For example, consider a heterosexual married couple.  They have some children together, but one of them also had a child with another individual prior to this marriage.  Now, the biological parent of that child dies.  Who has what necessary expectations regarding that child?  First, if there is a surviving biological parent who is capable of providing for the child's needs, that biological parent has the necessary expectation of being the primary provider.  What of the step-parent?  That step-parent may become the provider of the child's needs if it is shown that the biological parent is incapable of providing those needs.  However, if that is shown, the step-parent-step-child relationship does not in itself create a necessary expectation that the step-parent will become the primary provider for the step-child.  The fallback provider is society.  It is then society which exercises its discretion to determine whether providing that child care should be outsourced to the step-parent.  In many cases, I would expect society to decide that the step-parent should be the provider, but that does not diminish the fact that society is exercising a discretionary function in so deciding.  Similarly, a male partner of a biological father may become the provider for a child, but he does not have that expectation so long as 1) the biological father or the biological mother is still capable and willing to provide for the child's needs, and 2) society has not actually exercised its discretion to outsource its responsibility to the male partner.

Support and Recognition for All Child-Rearing
One might argue that all child rearing situations warrant societal support and recognition, including when the parents are homosexual - that no matter what the situation, those who are involved in raising a child warrant societal support and recognition.  Therefore, marriage should be extended to the LGBT community.  This, however, seems to be more of an argument revolving around equality than around inalienable rights.  To the extent that it is about inalienable rights, any right to societal support in child rearing alone does not indicate that all child rearing situations warrant the same societal support and recognition.  The concept of marriage simply does not apply to a single mother, no matter how deserving she might be of societal support. Similarly, the situation with homosexual parents is sufficiently unique (only one of the partners actually has a necessary expectation regarding his/her relationship to the child such that he/she is the primary provider of the child's needs) that regardless of how deserving they are in receiving societal support and recognition for raising a child, the right to marriage does not apply as of necessity.

Heterosexual Couples Without a Reasonable Anticipation that Sex will Create Life
Which brings me to another point often raised against the conservative version of marriage.  If marriage is about those who can have children as a result of their sexual activities, why should an infertile heterosexual couple, or an elderly couple, be allowed to be married if they can't have children?  The implication being that they are allowed to be married because they are in a loving, committed and sexually active relationship, just like homosexual couples.  Therefore, the argument goes, homosexual couples should be allowed to be married too.  However, it seems to me that a young infertile heterosexual couple generally marries with a good faith belief that they are both fertile.  By way of making this distinction as clearly as possible, the question is, "Why should an infertile heterosexual couple be allowed to be married, unless its because they are in a loving, committed, and sexually active relationship?"  The answer is, "Who reasonably anticipates being infertile?  Basically nobody.  Who reasonably anticipates that children will not result from a homosexual relationship?  Basically everybody."  Furthermore, while one partner in a heterosexual couple may know that they have fertility issues, it is practically impossible to know that fertility treatments will not empower the heterosexual couple to create a child.

The situation of the elderly couple is more difficult.  Simply put, there is no reason inherent to their relationship alone that they would give rise to an inalienable right to get married under the conservative version of marriage.  For example, what 80 year old woman reasonably anticipates that she can't get pregnant?  Basically, every 80 year old woman.  Therefore, it may be that the extension to elderly couples of the right to get married is merely a policy decision.  That is, unless it can be shown that the right to get married extends to the elderly as the result of some other inalienable right.  In other words, if  there is some other reason why individuals have a necessary expectation that society will not inquire into their biological fertility, then it is actually improper to exclude infertile or even elderly people from the right to marry.

The Right to Security in One's Person
One expectation which follows necessarily from the nature of the relationship between individuals and society is the expectation to be secure in one's person (which pretty clearly includes one's body if not more).  In American parlance, this is often referred to as the right to life, though it actually involves much more than that, overlapping in many ways with what is commonly called the right to privacy.  Society exists for the purpose of improving the lives of individuals through cooperation and peaceful coexistence.  This purpose does not arise out of some pre-societal natural state of humanity - no such condition ever existed.  However, even in evolutionary terms, society developed among various species as a way of providing greater protection for individual members so as to increase the overall chances of successful procreation.  As humanity emerged, more interests beyond mere procreation (such as a desire for meaningfulness, purpose, self-actualization, what have you) were introduced, and the role of human society has adapted to acknowledge these needs.  The basic premise underlying society, however, remains the same - securing individual members in their persons.  Should an individual, a group of individuals, or even the rest of society breach this inalienable right, the premise of society has been undermined.  Their actions are thus anti-social, constituting a rejection of the symbiotic relationship between individuals and society.  In other words, by virtue of the mere existence of society, an individual member of that society has the necessary expectation not to have their bodily integrity violated.  So, an individual has an expectation, which arises necessarily from their relationship with society, that other individuals, whether acting in their capacity as individuals or as agents of society, will not conduct medical investigations into that individual's body without that individual's consent.  Hence, society is prohibited from determining, without the consent of an individual, whether that individual is infertile.  Therefore, regarding the scope of individuals to which marriage must extend by right, there can only be a presumption that individuals are fertile.  The case of the elderly woman desiring to get married is difficult because it doesn't seem like there should be a presumption that she can have children.  However, if one considers the difficulty of determining at what age such a presumption no longer applies, it becomes clear that age is not determinative.  For example, young men and young women are physically maturing earlier and earlier, while there are more and more instances of women conceiving when it was thought that they could no longer conceive.  There simply doesn't seem to be an age at which one can affirmatively declare that no individual will ever be fertile. 

One might object that we have inquired as to the procreative success of homosexual couples, so why not others?  It seems clear to me that the nature of the inquiry is critical.  Homosexual individuals are just as free from imposed medical examinations to determine whether they are fertile or not.  The security of their persons, of their bodily integrity, is just as important.  However, there is no need for any further medical examination to conclude that a homosexual relationship between partners who are presumed fertile still cannot result in both partners being the biological parents of a child.  On the other hand, there is no need for any further medical examination to conclude that a heterosexual relationship between partners who are presumed fertile can result in both partners being the biological parents of a child. 

The LGBT Version of Marriage Briefly Considered
Having considered the conservative version of marriage and found it entirely plausible, what then of the LGBT version of marriage?  As indicated much earlier in this post, I think it is pretty evident that there is no inalienable right to societal recognition of and support for all relationships.  So, is there such a right in the particular circumstances presented by homosexual couples, and if so, is that right to societal recognition and support essentially the same as that historically provided by marriage?

The LGBT version of marriage, as I understand it, is that loving, committed, and sexually active relationships are entitled to societal support and recognition.  Each of these elements alone does not seem to create any sort of necessary expectation in connection with its relationship with society.  A loving relationship, alone, does not indicate either commitment, or even active involvement such that there is any sort of expectation from society, beyond perhaps general privacy expectations which might apply.  A committed relationship, alone, does not indicate the motivation for that commitment - the relationship could be coercive.  Similarly, a sexually active relationship, alone, does not seem to warrant any expectation from society, beyond privacy expectations (associated with the aforementioned right to have sex).  Sexual activity in conjunction with either love or commitment, also does not seem to create a reasonable expectation to societal support and recognition.  Sexually active and loving relationships have no inherent indication of duration or commitment that might warrant any such expectation.  I can only think of expectations associated with a general right to privacy or right to have sex.  On the other hand, sexually active and committed relationships also do not necessarily create any rational expectation of support and recognition.  Once again, mightn't such a committed relationship be coercive?  Many battered women are plenty committed to their abusers.  That hardly seems worthy of societal support and recognition.  So, we come to the conjunction of all three elements.  A general policy of encouraging sexual relationships to be committed and loving might be wise, but I just don't see that being a necessary expectation from society.  I don't see anything in the nature of the relationship between society and such lovingly committed, sexually active relationships which necessarily creates an expectation beyond a general expectation of privacy, clearly associated with an expectation of consenting adults to be free to enter into sexually active relationships, and to engage in such sexual activity in the privacy of their own homes. 

Furthermore, if there is some expectation to societal recognition and support for such relationships, is there any reason why that recognition and support must be the same as that provided in "traditional" marriage?  First, I recognize that my analysis here must be limited because I have not identified any potential justification for such societal recognition and support, so I cannot compare the justification with my discussion of the conservative version of marriage.  Furthermore, I recognize that there seems to be a strong equality argument here.  However, like I said at the beginning, arguments about equality and arguments about inalienable rights are distinct and should be treated accordingly.  So, as far as inalienable rights go, I don't see any reason why the two kinds of relationships addressed by the conservative version of marriage and the LGBT version of marriage would necessarily warrant the same support and recognition.  Marriage itself is only a right to societal recognition and support, the level of which is to be determined by policy considerations relevant to the time and place.  Why should any inalienable right to support and recognition connected to lovingly committed and sexually active relationships be tied by necessity to such policy decisions?  Furthermore, some states have begun to offer domestic partnerships.  If there is an inalienable right to societal recognition and support, why can't these suffice?  Therefore, the LGBT case must offer some reason why the validation of marriage in particular should be extended to their relationships.  From what I can tell, the further argument is that any difference in the rights and responsibilities granted in varying forms of societal validation is unequal and therefore illegitimate.  However, that does not create an inalienable right on its own terms, but is an argument about equality which must be considered separately under an equality analysis.

Conclusion
The LGBT version of marriage does not present a clear reason why all individuals involved in lovingly committed and sexually active relationships have a necessary expectation of societal support and recognition by virtue of the connection of those relationships to society.  Therefore, there does not seem to be an inalienable right to recognition and support for such relationships.  Supposing that there is a reason, there doesn't seem to be any reason under an inalienable rights analysis that would warrant the same policy decisions regarding the level of support and recognition as those made regarding the conservative version of marriage. 

The conservative version of marriage presents a reason why there is an inalienable right to marriage for heterosexual individuals involved in a loving and committed relationship.  Children are entitled to protection and guidance throughout their maturation process.  Those who provide that protection and guidance are entitled to societal recognition and support.  The biological parents of children are entitled to be the primary providers of that protection and guidance.  Where there are two surviving biological parents, they are equally entitled to be the primary providers of their children's protection and guidance, and if the parents so desire, they are entitled to particular support and recognition so as to encourage unity in the rearing of the child.  This particular support and recognition has historically been called marriage.  Two individuals in a homosexual relationship cannot both be the biological parents of a child.  Therefore, if any child is created as a result of the actions by either of the two individuals in a homosexual relationship, only one of them will have the right to be the primary provider of protection and guidance for that child.  Therefore, there is no entitlement to unite the child rearing interest of the primary provider with any interest held by the homosexual partner.  Therefore, the societal support and recognition involved with the relationship identified by the conservative version of marriage do not also apply to homosexual couples.

So, I hope you, my dear reader, have made it this far.  While I certainly don't expect to convince everybody (heck, I'd be pleasantly surprised if I convinced anybody given the emotionally charged nature of this issue), I do hope that those who agree with my view have a better understanding of their own position while those who do not agree with my view can better appreciate it and not merely conclude that their opposition is just a bunch of haters.